ssrf
Untrusted input controlling the destination of a server-side HTTP request.
Skill by jaiswalakshansh
Chalk Labs
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Install
Works with Claude Code, Claude apps, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf. Read the repository before you give any tool access to your data.
npx agentmarket install skill/jaiswalakshansh-ssrf
Asks which of your tools to add it to (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLI, Claude Desktop) and shows the change first. See https://agentmart.dev/cli.
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About
Use cases: backend
Reviews
Write a reviewNo reviews yet. Installed it? Reviews come from verified installers only. How reviews work
Permissions
What this skill can do and what it asks for, from its SKILL.md. Checked Oct 25, 2026.
- Tools
- No tools found
- Secrets
- None asked for
- Install scripts
- None found
Network hosts it talks to 1
codeload.github.com· found in install command
Files it touches
~/.claude/skills/ssrf
What's inside
- Skill name
ssrf- Description
- Untrusted input controlling the destination of a server-side HTTP request.
- License
- MIT
- Instructions
- 20 lines in SKILL.md · view on GitHub
Before installing
- Instructions call the network
Files (1)
- SKILL.md
SKILL.md (first lines)
# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) ## Recon Find HTTP-client sinks whose URL is influenced by input: `requests.*`, `urllib.request.urlopen`, `httpx.*`, `fetch`, `axios`. Sources: request params, webhooks, user-supplied URLs, metadata read back from storage. ## Verify (false-positive reduction) 1. Does attacker input control the host/scheme, or only a path under a fixed host? 2. Is there an allow-list of destinations, or scheme/host validation, before the request? A validated allow-list neutralizes SSRF. 3. Can the request reach internal ranges (169.254.169.254, localhost, RFC1918)? Reachability of internal targets raises severity. ## Evidence Source→sink path, the URL-building expression, and whether any allow-list applies. Note that *proving* SSRF requires a running target (dynamic testing); a static finding stays suspected.
From jaiswalakshansh/crucible, MIT.
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Signals
- Stars
- 0
- Forks
- 0
- Open issues
- 0
- Last commit (this folder)
- Jul 23, 2026 (3 months ago)
From GitHub (fetched Oct 24, 2026).
Details
- License
- MIT
- Repository
- github.com/jaiswalakshansh/crucible
- First seen
- Oct 24, 2026
- Last checked
- Oct 24, 2026
- Source
- GitHubgithub-graphql
More from jaiswalakshansh
- 0.471score
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jaiswalakshansh
Detect SQL injection: untrusted input reaching a database query without parameterization or safe escaping.
SkillCFreshness: CClaude Code +9 - 0.469score
broken-access-control
jaiswalakshansh
A resource or action reachable without an ownership/authorization check (IDOR, missing authz).
SkillCFreshness: CClaude Code +9 - 0.469score
insecure-deserialization
jaiswalakshansh
Untrusted data deserialized by an unsafe deserializer, enabling object injection / RCE.
SkillCFreshness: CClaude Code +9 - 0.469score
business-logic
jaiswalakshansh
A flaw in application logic (not a generic injection) that lets an attacker abuse intended functionality.
SkillCFreshness: CClaude Code +9 - 0.469score
command-injection
jaiswalakshansh
Untrusted input reaching an OS command execution sink without safe argument handling.
SkillCFreshness: CClaude Code +9 - 0.469score
insecure-llm-output
jaiswalakshansh
LLM/model output flowing into a dangerous sink (code/command/SQL/HTML) without validation.
SkillCFreshness: CClaude Code +9
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Cite this page
ssrf skill. Agent Mart. https://agentmart.dev/skills/jaiswalakshansh-ssrf (last updated 2026-10-24)